Wednesday, May 30, 2018

When is intrinsic motivation bad?


Intrinsic motivation – the desire to do a thing for its own sake – is often regarded as the ideal motivation in the context of designing incentive structures. But there are some cases when a reliance on intrinsic motivation leads to adverse selection.

Consider policing. How many cops are sociopaths? The rate in the general population is about 4%. If police were representative a naïve estimate might be that 4% police are sociopaths. But police are not drawn at random from the population – people choose to be police. This has interesting implications.

Suppose police operate under “low-powered” incentives, thus intrinsic motivation is a larger component of why people choose to become police. This could be desirable if the effort exerted by police is difficult to monitor, thinking along the lines of “we trust police to try and catch bad guys even when they aren’t monitored, because police actually want to catch bad guys”. And we might believe that they want that because if they were “in it for the money” i.e. not (at all, there are degrees) intrinsically motivated they wouldn’t have chosen a career in law enforcement in the first place.
The problem is that low-powered incentives can select for intrinsic motivation, but not for particular kinds of intrinsic motivations. You might want to become a cop because you want to serve your community and keep people safe – or you might want a cop because you want to be able to beat, harass, and bully people with impunity. That is to say, you’re a sociopath sitting pretty in the middle of the “dark triad” of narcissism, machiavellianism, and sadism and despite low-powered incentives would so enjoy abusing others that you do the work anyway.

What can you do about this adverse selection problem? If you don’t want to throw the baby out with the bathwater (so to speak) and keep selecting for (public-spirited) intrinsically motivated cops by using low-powered incentives then you need effective and rigorous screening and accountability measures to weed out those who want to be cops for the wrong reasons. If you can’t or won’t do that, then you need to consider whether it would be worth it (or even possible) to switch to “high-powered” incentives and do away with intrinsic motivation altogether, good or bad. In the American context, with an extremely fractured patchwork of law enforcement agencies that vary wildly in professionalism and accountability, this is particularly a problem – a “bad cop” can just get a job at another department. One department could be doing everything right, and another 20 minutes away could be doing everything wrong – and then cops sort into departments that match their behaviors.
Should we rely on the intrinsic motivation of police? To make the judgement, you have to ask yourselves “Do I think there are more public-spirited people who want to become cops than sociopaths?” or “Do I think there are more public-spirited cops than sociopathic cops?”

I can’t answer those questions. But I think the answer is probably that the proportion of cops who are sociopaths is greater than x. Police unions fight tooth-and-nail against every measure of accountability, no matter how small – and I have little doubt that plans to consolidate police departments into larger, more professional organizations would provoke howls of protest. But more fundamentally, I just think that the temptations of the power given to American police – in practice, the power to deprive another of life, liberty, and property with near impunity – is so much more tempting to the sociopath than the public-spirited person’s desire to use a badge and a gun to actually help people. I guess I just think there are a lot more shitty people out there than really good ones, so if you set up an incentive structure that mostly attracts shitty people or good people, you’re going to end up with a lot more shitty people than good.

There’s a lot of jobs like this consider the case of prison guards – we want prison guards to only be in it for the money. People who enjoy being jailers probably shouldn’t be.

Just some food for thought.

Sunday, May 6, 2018

The Coming Automation Crisis


The coming automation crisis is not a technological crisis. Rather, it is a crisis of governance in the most basic sense. A fairly recent report from the Mckinsey Global Institute makes this obvious - though they studiously avoid drawing attention to this alarming conclusion.

Overall, MGI anticipates tens of millions of workers will be displaced by automation over the next 10-15 years, depending on the speed of automation. At the high end of their estimates, 73 million US workers (a little less than half of workforce!) would be displaced. Most of those displaced would have to switch occupations entirely. Their middle-of-the-road projection is still dramatic: only quarter of the workforce displaced, and with half of those switching occupation entirely.

The MGI report has plenty of suggestions for policy responses, but the US has essentially no public or private sector apparatus up to the challenge of smoothing this transition. The American government spends the least of any OECD country on labor markets. That money is used for job training and placement, for hiring subsidies and hiring in the public sector, and for unemployment benefits. Of the little money that is spent, only a tenth of that goes to job training – less than half of what Canada spends, and less than a sixth of what Germany spends, and a tenth of the amount France spends. The only tools that that remain are monetary policy and educational policy. 

Using monetary policy to maintain full employment is problematic for practical reasons and political reasons. The political problem is that central bankers tend to be more concerned with inflation than unemployment - witness the recent preemptive interest rate hikes by the US Fed. God forbid we should wait for robust wage growth before panicking about an inflationary spiral!

Even if by some minor miracle the Fed changed course and pursued a policy of full employment at all costs, the for-profit sector in the United States is not up to dealing with this crisis. MGI highlights a few firms who invest in employee development, but these anecdotes are misleading. Overall the share of workers receiving on-the-job or employer-sponsored training has declined sharply since 1996, and stagnated since 2004. You will note that this period includes part of the 1990s boom, and 2001-2007 boom. This is entirely rational behavior on the part of firms, since a worker who receives valuable training could find work elsewhere. And since firms show no loyalty to their employees, it would be sheer madness to expect workers to show loyalty to their employers,

This leaves only educational institutions and workers themselves. And educational institutions are not ready for this either. For people entering the labor force, the future looks bleak. Only about 36% of Americans age 25-29 have 4-year college degrees or more. For the majority American's associate degrees, high-school degrees, and the nebulous term "some college" are the highest level of educational attainment. For such people, quality high-school vocational programs are invaluable. But MGI’s best guess, since US data are hard to come by, is that less than 6% of Americans in secondary schools are enrolled in a vocational program, which would give those with only a high-school degree a fair chance That’s a smaller share enrolled than Brazil(!), and a tenth(!) of the Swiss level of enrollment. As far as post-secondary education goes, the federal state governments have systematically pulled back on support for public higher education for decades, exacerbating spiraling tuition costs and miring a generation of graduates in debt. What about community colleges, where displaced middle- and low-skill workers will most likely go for retraining? Data here are hard to come by, for the same reasons that data on high schools are hard to come by, but the ability of community colleges to handle the crisis does not look good. Tuition is not trivial, though it varies wildly across states - about $5,000 for in-state public schools. Student debt, graduation rates, and transfers to 4-year schools for community college graduates also looks terrible. About 10 million people are enrolled in community colleges in the US in any given year, with about 2.5 million full-time students. Remember we're talking tens of millions of workers displaced by automation over the period, with half that number needing to switch occupations entirely, requiring extensive retraining. I doubt our current educational system even has the capacity to cope with so many students, let alone provide a good education to all of them.

The MGI report helpfully makes two forecasts; a trend-line forecast where things continue as they are going and a step-up forecast where the government takes active measures to reduce the impact of automation on employment. Only the step-up forecast doesn't result in net job losses.

Read all that and tell me you aren't worried.

This is what I mean when I say the automation crisis is a crisis of governance. No problem described above cannot be addressed, even solved, by straightforward policy responses. Not  government that cannot act, not government that does not know how to act, but government that for structural and ideological reasons - political reasons! - will not act. This is the American Crisis today.


Monday, April 30, 2018

Some notes on information and policymaking.

I was going to post this on Facebook, but it got too long...

This post is to lay out some key points and ideas for my classmates, who apparently were disappointed by today's lecture.

First read Hayek's classic paper on tacit knowledge. This describes the essential informational problem in economics (and generally): information is dispersed and impossible to perfectly transfer.  That information needs to be aggregated into some form useful for decision-making.

This is an especially relevant problem for policy-makers, who (ideally) try to choose and design the best policy for the most people. Without good information, success in that isn't about skill but dumb luck.

The wisdom of crowds is the simplest method of aggregating information, relying on some statistical ideas (the most likely single value for a random variable is its mean, and that over- and under- estimates will tend to cancel each other out) and some cognitive psychology (lying is generally more cognitively burdensome than honesty, so people will tell the truth unless they have some other reason to lie).

The classic example is from a contest held in 1906 in rural England. Now apparently rural England is quite boring,  and there is a prize after all, so a crowd 800 people decided to try to guess the weight of a cow. Now along comes a statistician, Francis Galton, who decides that it would be fun to analyze the guesses of the crowd. He does this, and discovers that the mean of the crowds estimate (1197lb.) was almost exactly the measured weight of the cow(1198lb.) and even more interestingly, was closer than an individual person's guess.

The contest aggregated the diverse information of the crowd into information more accurate than what any single person possessed. This is one of bases of the argument that "diversity trumps ability" (there is some academic argument around that, but that it is not immediately obvious is itself somewhat startling).

The cow-contest also illustrates the problems of this method. Almost immediately people begin trying to cheat: sabotage, bribery of the owner of the cow, and all manner of rural shenanigans, since a person can better improve their odds by attacking the structure of the contest, instead of, say, practicing their cow-weight-guessing skills at home.

The cow-contest also illustrates the problem of groupthink very clearly. In the original contest, participants wrote down their guesses of the cow's weight and submitted them privately - each person using their private information. In other contests, where peoples guesses were not private, the wisdom of crowds failed. Why? People were communicating with each other, and while a lie is cognitively costly, social discord is even more costly - thus agreement is more important than honesty. I am sure we have all experienced the social pressures of the white lie.

I could explain this by references to human evolution (better to go along with the tribe in a bad decision than strike out on your own), to social dynamics (people like other people who agree with them, even about trivial things), and of course, to sabotage and intimidation (one way to rig the contest is to circulate false information, or to threaten to break the legs of everyone who doesn't guess 0).

Now, in general, markets also perform this function - especially when talk is not cheap, and agents are sophisticated or engaged in frequent and repeated transactions. This is the idea behind decision markets.

Informational problems are also fundamental to political systems. One way to think about democracy (and about the importance of secret ballots) is as a way of aggregating diverse tacit information.Even in authoritarian systems, like China, the Communist Party uses secret ballots and elections for Party and local elections.

I hope this has been fun, informative, or useful.

Wednesday, April 11, 2018

The Intellectual Death of Conservatism


I was going to write an ambitious, highly speculative piece tying together brain drain, anti-intellectualism, and disinvestment from education in the context of rural America. All that assumed that rural people are more anti-intellectual. But this paper from Jay A. DeSart of Utah Valley University blows that assumption out of the water.

If I’m reading his table right, he finds that rural people not significantly more likely to be anti-intellectual per-se, only that they’re more focused on practical education. But since rural America is older, less-educated, more religious, and more conservative, it looks like that at first glance. But some regression analysis to control for various factors causes that to drop away. Surprisingly (or perhaps not) after controls for, e.g. education income too is unassociated with anti-intellectualism.

So now I’m dipping into the literature to see what there is to see. DeSart’s paper, very helpfully, reports the strength of his findings and finds only 4 clusters of factors that are relevant with high confidence: Education, religiosity (church attendance, biblical literalism, etc.), political beliefs (ideology, sense of power over one’s life, trust in institutions, etc.) and gender.

So this is a cross-sectional snapshot. What about over time?

Enter Gordon Gauchat of University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. He has a 2012 paper examining trends in politicization of anti-intellectualism and distrust of experts over time. SPOILER ALERT: American conservatives have been gradually getting more anti-intellectual and less trusting of experts since the 1990s. Liberals have trended in the opposite way. Quoting from the abstract:

“Results show that group differences in trust in science are largely stable over the period, except for respondents identifying as conservative.”


A more recent and in-depth study by Matthew Motta of University of Minnesota-Twin Cities finds the same thing in 2016 and shows further that support for Trump was associated with anti-intellectualism above and beyond the support for Trump from conservatives in general. That is, more anti-intellectual Republicans were more likely to support Trump.

So where does that leave the project that motivated this exploration? Sunk and gone. There are two real questions. First: why has conservative anti-intellectualism has grown and hardened? And second, what does this mean going forward. Here I will resume wild mass guessing – since after all I write this for my own amusement.

You may remember this poll that found that a majority of Republicans, for the first time ever, said they thought higher education was bad for the country.

Here’s one hypothesis: pure tribalism. Education tends to make people less conservative, and less anti-intellectual. If you want to keep people in the “tribe” of conservatism, you want to keep them away from higher education. This is, on an individual level, fairly rational. Of course you want to avoid the strife, the arguments, the emotional distance and social fracturing that will result from little Connor going off to college and forming a worldview that differs from your own. 

But this is somewhat hard to do, since it’s a well-established result that higher education generally leads to higher earnings and better life outcomes.

So, what you have to do is say to Connor “college is bad.” Not bad for Connor – because it plainly isn’t – but bad for society, bad in general.

You can see the shape of the intergenerational dynamics of this: the most intellectually inclined “educate out”  on the margin, becoming less anti-intellectual and less conservative. Leaving the rest more conservative and anti-intellectual.

But how did anti-intellectualism become so intertwined with American right? It could be religion, if religiously motivated anti-intellectuals have sorted into the GOP since the 1990s.
But my guess is that it is something more fundamental.

The death of expertise in the GOP and the anti-intellectualism of the conservative movement are intertwined. Why do you need experts? Because you care about what’s true and understand that the world is complicated and difficult to understand. But what if what is true is (politically) inconvenient? You could change your beliefs. Or you could change your beliefs about beliefs, and cease to care about the truth at all. But if the truth doesn’t matter, if facts don’t matter, if ideas are no longer tested by experience – why have experts? Why seek to know, why welcome knowledge at all?

And if your party doesn’t care about the truth, about knowledge, and intellectuals, almost definitionally, do, then of course you aren’t going to have much support among them, and every new cohort is going to look at the existing cohort and think – “why bother, they don’t care about my work”.

The GOP’s position on a host of issues follows this pattern – with climate change being the most clear-cut and obvious example. The entire trajectory of the policy minds around that man in the White House follows this pattern and I think it’s important to point out that this is not a break with the norms of the American right, but rather a continuation of decades-long trends.

So now for the second question: What does this mean going forward?

I don’t know, but I doubt its good. One possibility is that the conservative movement suffers an intellectual “death spiral” with each round of intellectuals exiting (or not entering) causing more hostility or indifference to intellectual thought, leading to more exits, etc.

That leaves a political movement that’s nothing but a seething ball of white rage with absolutely no regard for the facts and even the minimal restraints of reality. That seems… bad.

Another possibility is that intellectual collapse proceeds political collapse, and from the rubble a new, saner, coalition can be built. That would be a good outcome, but I imagine the process would be chaotic and uncertain.

One thing I do not see happening is this trend reversing anytime soon. For now, this is American politics.

Tuesday, April 3, 2018

I thought we won the Cold War?


In 1992 the Soviet Union finally collapsed. And so did life expectancies for Russian men. Between 1990 and 1994 life expectancy at birth for males fell by 5 years, plummeting to less than 60 years.

Why?

The collapse of the Soviet Union caused tremendous (momentous!) social and economic disruption. Workers, places and firms were thrown from a predictable planned economy into the open water of free-market capitalism. It was sink or swim – and many sank. The death rate for employment-age men shot up, driven by cardiovascular disease, drug and alcohol consumption, accidents, homicides, and suicides. This collapse in male life expectancy cost 2.5-3 million lives. I want to restate that for everyone. If death rates had stayed what they were under the Soviet Union 2.5 million deaths would have been avoided.

And what does this pattern of deaths look like? It looks like rusting out Russian factory towns dying on the vine, like millions of men thrown out of work and dropping out of the labor force, and like thousands of factories shuttering- unable to compete in a global economy. And all alongside millions of men dying quiet deaths of despair. It looks like country where since 1992 the number of drug addicts has risen 9-fold, where the rate of HIV infection has doubled every year since 1992, where today 6% of the population are drug users, a country that has a GDP per capita less than a quarter of the United States' but is home to as many billionaires per capita than the United States.

This is what it meant for Russia to lose the Cold War.

So why does that story sound so familiar to Americans? Why does Magnitogorsk remind me of Youngstown? Is this what winning means?

Why has America been plagued by “deaths of despair”. Why is it that, for the first time since the end of WWII, life expectancy at birth declined in 2015, driven by suicides and drug use? Why have rates of opiate addiction and death increased sharply? Why has male labor force participation declined and not recovered? Why are Americans more depressed than the citizens of other developed countries? Why is our infant mortality rate so high, why are our bridges falling down, why this, why that, why the other?

Didn’t we win the Cold War?

I can’t answer those questions. That’s a project for a whole pack of scholars. Some of those links try to. But I want to ask the big question, the fundamental question, for myself and for anyone who’s reading this. For 60 years the United States was locked in a titanic, life-or-death, global struggle with the Soviet Union that repeatedly threatened the world with nuclear annihilation. Both made massive investments, and implicitly and explicitly, massive sacrifices, to pursue that struggle. The Soviet Union lost. But looking at these statistics, at America, I have to ask: did we win?

Because this is not what success looks like. Where is our peace dividend? All the sacrifices we made, the resources we spent, the civilian projects and peaceful goals once sidelined to confront the Soviet Union –  was this all that was gained, waiting out the Red colossus until it collapsed under its own weight? Why haven’t we enjoyed the fruits of peace? To ask the question it to express my disappointment (this cynic is ever disappointed, but seldom surprised) and anger that this has come to pass. The United States of America does not have to resemble – should not resemble! - a broken-down, declining superpower, limping along with a legacy nuclear arsenal, run by a regime of authoritarian oil-loving kleptocrats, plagued by corruption, drug addiction, and violence.

Wednesday, March 28, 2018

Book Review: Rules for Radicals by Saul Alinksy


One sleepless night last week I read “Rules for Radicals” by Saul Alinsky – that bugbear of a certain segment of the right. I write this now, after some sleep, while the book is still fresh in my mind.

It says something about the Alinsky’s life and work that decades after his death his name is still spoken with such vitriol in certain reactionary circles. And reading this book I can see why! Alinsky’s tactics were disquieting. That was the entire point! Alinksy sought to change the status quo by discomforting those comfortable with it, disturbing people who should be disturbed by the present situation but aren’t. If you’re going to use protest and activism to try and force changes (the other uses of protests are for elsewhere) it can’t be something people can just ignore. Alinsky’s politics made him enemies, and he spent his life fighting them. Many of the same sorts who so resented say, holding shop-ins (packing department store with discriminatory labor policies with black shoppers to spook affluent whites) are still alive and circulating in American politics today. That Alinsky was on the right side of history apparently still galls them.

But at the same time, separating the book from the author, “Rules for Radicals” is fairly… I don’t want to say banal, since truthfully it is a well written and useful manual, but it is nevertheless a manual; and similar sorts of advice could be found reading other treatises on strategy, tactics, and political maneuvering. What might be especially useful is that it places these concepts in the context of organizing and provides many illustrative (and entertaining!) examples. Still, what is useful is not new to a 21st century reader. For example, Alinsky was quite enthusiastic about the possibilities of the then new tactic of campaigning for proxy votes. But those tactics are now well known and widely used, precisely because they were effective.

The advice in “Rules for Radicals”, like all advice, is easier to give than to follow. In no particular order, and with no guarantee of completeness, I’ll try to summarize and comment on the key notes.
First, the organizer is advised to always respect the personhood and dignity of others. That this advice needs to be given is somewhat embarrassing. That it is not always followed is downright shameful. The organizer must be liked by the organizees, since there is no power to compel they must freely give their support.

Second, the organizer is advised to have a pragmatic, even cynical view of human nature – the sort of view you can find, expressed mathematically, in most economic models. At the same time, people are reliably irrational and you can use that. For example, Alinsky believes that people seldom right thing for the right reasons. However, you can get them to the right thing for the wrong reasons, and once that is done they’ll rationalize their behavior so that in their mind they were right all along. There’s much more than that, but this is a review and a summary, so if you are curious you’ll have to read up on these things yourself.

The third piece of advice is to meet people where they are and stay within their frame of reference. This is part of the art of organizing – different communities will have different experiences, and so different things will be possible. Essentially the organizer must have low expectations. The best organizing involves the uninvolved, which is hard enough to do when all you need is signature, let alone a more substantive contribution. So make things as easy as possible for people.

There is one other thing that stands out in Alinsky’s understanding of organizing, and of politics in general. Alinsky understands that politics, especially politics in a free, democratic society, is about more than power and incentives, substantive gains and losses. It is about theatre. Showmanship, the emotional appeal, the narrative presented to the mass audience is just as important. Maybe more important. To quote Napoleon:

“A man does not get himself killed for sixpence a day and a piece of ribbon. You must speak to the soul to electrify him”.

Tuesday, March 20, 2018

"Are we the baddies?"

So Trump's pick for CIA director is a veteran torturer. Feminism in the 21st century - now women too can be clear-cut villains.

               In Star Wars, how is it established that the Rebels are the “good guys” and the Empire are the “bad guys”? That is, what shortcuts are taken over the length of feature film that allow the audience to identify the morality of each side of the conflict? Oh, certainly we are inclined by mere familiarity to sympathize with Luke, a humble farmboy from a backwater planet dreaming of the stars. But Imagine if you will that you were watching the film de novo, (difficult I know). Luke casually remarks that he is thinking about becoming a pilot for the Empire! If the villainy of the Empire isn’t immediately obvious to Luke, our sympathetic protagonist, how is obvious to us?

                First is the style of the empire, meant to evoke the Third Reich. “Stormtroopers” and cleanly cut grey uniforms – the assumption being that the audience would make the association with fascism, and with fascism to plain evil. Another trick for managing our sympathies are the face-concealing masks of the stormtroopers, meant to dehumanize the antagonists.

                But it is in the conduct of the Empire that its essentially villainous nature is laid bare. The audience is expected to immediately and unambiguously look at the actions of the Empire and go: “They are the bad guys, only bad guys would do things like that”.

                So, what does the Empire do? In the pursuit of vital intelligence, the Empire kills innocent civilians, tramples on civilian authority, and tortures suspects. With the aim of intimidating its enemies it a weapon of mass destruction and demonstrates it on a target of limited military value. It tramples on democratic rights and institutions in the name of peace and order.

                But save the last, the United States has done all these things. The secrecy of the security state, warrantless wiretapping and mass-surveillance, the absurdly broad war-making powers in the post-9/11 AUMF altogether seem to constitute, if not trampling, then at least walking, on civilian authority. The drone war – in Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Syria, and other places, may or may not keep America safe, but it certainly sheds a lot of innocent blood. And of course the United States used – perhaps is still using, for such things are kept secret – torture with the aim of obtaining vital intelligence. We developed nuclear weapons and used them on targets of limited military value (Nagasaki and Hiroshima were chosen precisely because for that reason they had been only lightly damaged in previous bombings). And after demonstrating our power, we used our to advance ourselves at the expense of others. And the American government has in the past, and continues in the present, to be much more talk than action on human rights – even the rights of its own citizens.
               
            Now, all of these things, it is argued, were done from necessity. Perhaps so. But I am somewhat concerned that the American people did not, do not, balk at these acts, that we do not turn our heads and go: “No that is not us, we’re the good guys, the good guys don’t do that”. It suggests that, at least for some, the reason why the Empire is the villain of Star Wars is not because the Empire is bad, but because the Empire opposes the protagonist. That because of the choices of the storyteller we do not sympathize with Luke because he is the “good guy”, but rather he is the “good guy” because we sympathize with him. That the same story could be told as a tragedy, with Empire doing everything it has to, yes, even unpleasant things, to protect itself, but despite its sacrifices is still overthrown. That you could easily make Vader the hero, and Luke the villain – and that people would believe it.